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Abstract
Unlike prototype immigration countries, Germany has attracted a large number of
southernEuropeansas temporaryguestworkersinthe60s and70s. Nevertheless,many
ofthem have stayed on and intend to remain inGermany. I investigate whether these
workershavebecomesuccessfullyintegratedintotheGermanlabormarketas reflected
bytheirearnings. Analyzing data from the Socioeconomic Panelforthe 80s I find that
guestworkers earn 20 to 25 percent less than Germans but their earnings do not seem
to catch up to the overall mean. This is due to the fact thatthe guestworkers are almost
entirely confined to blue collar positions. Among blue collar workers there is little
noticable difference between the earnings ofGermans and foreigners.
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Foreigners who migrate to traditional immigrant countries, the U.S., Canada, or
Australia, tend to start their labor market careers with relatively low earnings. But
soon the immigrants share in the prosperity of their surrounding. This process of
ass4nilation, as economists call it, has been associated with the immigrants learning
the ~local language, acquiring skills relevant to the host country labor market,
discovering the niches most suited to their traits, etc. That immigrants soon catch up
to natives is le'ss than surprising given that they often move in search of better
opportunities.
Judging from the magnitudes ofthe migrationflows, many countries in Europe today
have become immigrant countries. About 5 millionforeigners live in Germany. They
make up almost 10percentofthe laborforce inthe westernpartofthe country, making
it the most important immigrant country in western Europe. Many ofthe foreigners
have come originally as guestworkers, temporary migrants who were supposed to fill
the gap during times oftight labor markets. A large fraction have stayed throughout
the following recessions, and they are unlikely to returnhome in the future. Have they
taken a similarly prosperous path as migrants who moved to one of the traditional
immigration countries?
Following the seminal work of Chiswick (1978) there is a large literature on the
assimilationofforeigners forthe U.S., and to alesserdegree forCanadaand Australia.
Part ofthe extensive debate in the U.S. is due to the limitations ofthe available data:
mest studies use one or more ofthe decennial census. Since migrants are unlikely to
be a random group, much of the discussion has focused on the identification of
assimilationrates inthe presence ofself-selectionandotherconfoundingeffects. Little
wonder that no consensus has arisen on the magnitude and pattern ofthe assimilation
rates ofdifferent immigrant groups.
Researchers in Germany are relatively fortunate; the Socio Economic Panel (SOEP)
contains a large subsample offoreigners. While the SOEP has been conducted since
1984,theeconomicsituationofforeigners inGermanyhasnotfoundextensiveattention
in the literature yet. Dustmann (1990) has first exploited the SOEP to estimate
assimilation rates but he only uses the first wave ofthe data. LichtandSteiner(1992b)
have subsequently addressed the assimilation issue with the first sixwaves, presenting
fixed effects estimates. Both studies find economically and statistically significant
positive assimilation rates although they may be somewhat lower than the estimates
for the U.S.
In this paper, I present a variety of estimates of the assimilation rates for male
guestworkers in the SOEP thus exploring the robustness of different estimation
strategies. My approach also differs from the two earlier studies as it tries to build a
bridge to the large American literature. The second section is devoted to a detailed
discussion of the various assumptions inherent in the cross-section and repeatedcross-section estimates for the U.S. A readerfamiliar with the literature may want to
skip this section. In the empiricalpart I start by presenting pooled cross section results
that would be roughly comparable to what has been done in the U.S. I demonstrate
that forthe SOEP there is not much difference between cross section and panel results
controlling for cohort or individual fixed effects.
I find very little evidence for assimilation during the sample period this. A basic
problem is-ethat the guestworker population in Germany is rather "old," potentially
already beyondthe phase where importantassimilation effects take plac~. I will try to
uncover some ofthe patterns ofearnings growth of subgroups among the foreigners
butalotremainsunclear. Theresultsprovide littleevidencethatthe earnings offoreign
guestworkers catch up to the earnings of Germans because guestworkers are mostly
confined to unskilled and semi-skilled blue collar jobs offering few possibilities of
advancement.
-
2 Identifying the Assimilation ofImmigrants: A Stylized Survey
"----.
Much ofthe debate in the American literature on the economic status ofimmigrants
has evolvedaroundthe issueofwhatestimatedassimilationrates actuallymean. Early
on the debate has focused on the issue ofdisentangling assimilation from a possible
seculardecline in the unobserved ability ofsubsequent immigrant cohorts. With two
ormoreofthedecennialcensuses age (assimilation)andcohorteffectscanbeseparated
but atthe costofstringent assumptions on the influence oftime effecJs. Lately, these
assumptions have come under attack since they seem untenable in an environment
characterized by a widening of the wage distribution.
1 Other problems, like biases
from selective remigration, while acknowledged, have found less attention since few
suitable panel datasets are available for the U.S.
Noneofthesequestionsofidentificationareparticularlyexotic,theyappearin avariety
of contexts in labor economics and elsewhere. For example, the statistical model
appliedfor studying assimilation is similarto the models used to study tenure effects.
Since cross section data require relatively strong identifying assumptions and careful
model specification, the debate has evolved around relaxing one or another ofthese
assumptions. To set the stage for the empirical part ofthe paper I will reiterate the
debate focussing onthe various identifying assumptions. \
1) These issues are also well summarized by Lalonde and Topel (1990) and by Baker and
Benjamin (1992).
2We wish to estimate a standardearningsequationon a dataset containing observations
on immigrants and natives. The goal is to distinguish differential slopes in the
age-earnings profile for immigrants and natives, the difference being associated with
assimilation ofthe immigrants into the host country labor market. Equation (1) is a
rather general example ofsuch an earnings equation.
The first two terms in equation (1) are the typical schooling (S;) and experience (Xit)
variables. For exposition, I have entered experience only linearly rather than as a
quadratic or higher order polynomial. No additional insights are gained from more
complicated functional fonns. On the contrary, they may trick us into using the
functional fonn of the time varying variables for identification purposes, a rather
tenuous assumption. I will also assume that experience is constructed as age minus
schooling minus age at first enrollment.
Notice that schooling is not indexed by t, signifying a time invariant factor that can
only be estimated from cross-section information. This assumption should be
reasonable for the bulk ofthe population who obtain all their formal schooling at the
beginningoftheirlife-time. S; couldbeavectorofvariablessatisfyingthisassumption.
I have indexed the first two coefficients, Cl.oj' (Xlj' by j standing for natives (n) and
\-
migrants (m). Thus baseline earnings (Cl.oj) may differfor natives and immigrants, so
may'returnstoschooling. Ontheotherhand,itmakesnosensetodistinguishdifferential
returns to experience when we talk about assimilation as I will argue below.
Inthis stylizedearnings equation, schooling andexperience are the onlytwo variables
relevant for natives; for immigrants a number offurther variables are observed. The
firstis years sincemigration, YSM;" thevariableofinterestthatwillallowustomeasure
assimilation. Notice that ithas acoefficient ~2i that is indexedbyindividual. I didthis
to highlightthat assimilationrates may differamong immigrantgroups. Ofcourse, we
will have to impose some restrictions onthe assimilation coefficientinthe estimation.
The next two variables are age at entry, AGEl; and an entry cohort effect, "'e' both
variables that do not vary over time.
Finally, equation (I) allows for a three-component error consisting of an individual
effect, a time effect, and a time-individual effect. I will explain below why the time
effect t;1 is indexed by individual. Depending on the'model we will have to assume
that some orall ofthese errorcomponents are uncorrelated with the regressors.
3Estimating Assimilation with Cross Section Data
Letus turnto concrete applications ofmodel (1). The seminalpapertrying to estimate
assimilationrates inthe U.S. isthe onebyChiswick(1978), who usedthe 1970Census,
i.e. a single cross-section. Itis immediately obvious that the effects due to YSM, and
entrtcohorts "'e cannot be disentangeled. Given that Chiswick wanted to study
assimilationitis nosurprisethathechosetoenterYSM implying "'e = 0 . ·Furthermore,
wewillcombinethethreeerrorcomponentsinto Ui/ andassumetheyarealluncorrelated
with the regressors. This yields the restricted model
(2)
which is roughly what Chiswick estimated. Figure 1 plots two representative
age-earnings profiles for a similar native and immigrant. They both have the same
schooling levelbut this level ofschoolingyields differential returns in theirrespective
homecountries. Similarly,returns to experience are lowerforthepotentialimmigrant.
AtAGEl j the migrantmoves, a step potentially associated with a further earnings loss.
Equation (2) does not allow for sucha loss but this is inconsequential. Since we only
have data on immigrants already in the host country, we can lump this loss into the
constant ~m' .Atthe timeofimmigration, theimmigrantreceives earnings A whilethe
native has by now reached earnings level B. Hence, the immigrant is at an initial
earnings disadvantage (B - A). Now the earnings profile ofthe immigrant steepens
and he eventually overtakes the native atpoint C.
Howmuch ofthe slope ofthe age.-earnings profile ofthe immigrant shall we attribute
togeneralexperienceandhowmuchto assimilation? Therearetwo obviouscandidates
fora reference levels we canuse as.general experience. Thefirst is to assume that the
experience profile ofimmigrants in the absence ofassimilation is the same as that of
natives (broken line in figure 1). The second is to assert that assimilation should be
measuredoverandabovetheexperienceprofile animmigranthadinhis home country
(dotted line infigure 1). Earnings ofnatives has been the choice adoptedthroughtout
most ofthe literature.
Thebasicreasonforthis choiceis thathomecountryearnings are notobserved. Home




ofnatives are the onlypossiblechoice. Evenonamoreconceptual level, itseemsmore
sensible to measure assimilation with respect to the experience ofnatives rather than
the experienceofforeigners who nevermigrated. Tofix ideas, suppose there are three
4countries, the United Kingdom, the U.S., and Mexico. Assume that the U.K. and the
U.S. have the same, positive experience profile while earnings do not rise with
experience in Mexico. Suppose that everybody coming to the U.S. immediately has
thesameearningsas anative. Usinghomecountryexperienceas areference,we would
now say that there is tremendous assimilation of Mexicans. Englishmen in the U.S.
would not assimilate at all. This interpretation seems rather strange. Nevertheless, it
is adopted by some authors, e.g. Dustmann (1990).
Furthermore,noticethatallowing fordifferential slopesonXit is equivalentto allowing
for AGElj in the equation since home country experience is identified via the age at
immigration. Ifwe choose a separate Xit for immigrants, assimilation with respect to
'natives will be givenby ~2+ CXzm -~. Using AGEli as a regressor instead lets us read
the assimilation rate directly offthe coefficient ~2'
Chiswick's specification is somewhat more restrictive in this respect. Since he does
not allow for age at entry effects he forces everyone's earnings differential at entry to
be the same. He found ratherhighassimilation rates. Immigrants, whileentering with
an earnings disadvantage of 16 percent (due to lower returns to their schooling),
overtake natives after only 13 years in the U.S. Assimilation is highest at entry at a
rateof1.5 percentperyear, falling slowlyto 1.3 percentafter 10years intheU.S. After
I 10 yearS'assimilation has added 13 percent to the earnings ofimmigrants relative to
natives, thus almost closing the initial gap. Chiswick attributed the high assimilation
rates and the overtaking ofnatives to positive selection ofmigrants.
CohortEffects
The rather promising finding offast assimilation has been challenged by Borjas in a
series ofpapers (1985, 1987). Borjas' maincriticismis thatthehighassimilationrates
estimatedbyChiswickmayratherbe dueto the decliningqualityofsubsequentcohorts
of immigrants. Figure 2 illustrates how this will yield spuriously high assimilation
rates.
Interms ofthe econometricmodel(1)theproblemcanbe solvedbyallowingforcohort
effects captured by the variable"'c' Themodel usedby Borjas essent~allyextends the
Chiswick model by allowing for these effects.
(3)
Ifwe have at least two cross sections available we can estimate (3) by entering cohort
dummyvariablesandthus identifyassimilationas wellas cohorteffects. Borjas(1987)
essentiallyfollowedthis strategybutrestrictedthecohorteffectstolie alongaquadratic
5profile. He found annual assimilation rates after 10 years inthe U.S. ranging from 3.2
percentfor,Koreans to -1.0percentforPortugese. His estimatesalso revealeddeclining
cohort quality for many immigrant groups.
It is possible to estimate the model in (3) and allow assimilation rates to vary across
cohorts. Inhis 1985paper,Borjashas allowedforsuchflexibilityofthe cohortspecific
age-earnings profiles of immigrants. He found indeed that the profiles varied
considerably by cohort. However, he presents in that paper a decomposition of the
earnings growth for immigrants found on a cross section (C-A in figure 2) into an
assimilationeffect(B-A) andaneffectdue to the change incohortquality (C-B). This
decomposition,however,makesonlysenseiftrueassimilationrates arethe sameacross
cohorts as Duleep and Regets (1992) point out. Ifsome cohorts enter with a larger
initial earnings gap but make up for this entirely by faster assimilation then Borjas'
decomposition would (incorrectly) assign this faster assimilation to the (spurious)
cohort effect.
Itis easy to seehow cohortspecific assimilationrates canbe identifiedfrom two cross
sections by forming average cohort data. Think of taking means for every level of
schooling for natives and for interactions of years of schooling and entry cohort for
migrants in(3). Denotethe resultingvariablesbyZet. This wouldreducethe schooling
variableas wellas the cohorts effectsto constants withineverygroupovertime. Using
these means, estimates ofseparate assimilation rates for every entry cohort are given
as
(4)
Such cohort specific assimilation rates are presented in Lalonde and Topel (1991).
Theyfindthatassimilationtendstobe slowerforearlierentrycohortsandforEuropean
immigrants who enter the U.S. with less of a wage differential. Duleep and Regets
(1992) relate changes in wage growth ofimmigrants to changes in the level ofentry
wages for schooling-age-nation cells and find a strong negative relationship. These
findings make some ofBorjas' interpretations rather questionable.
Before closing this subsection ~t should be mentioned that spurious assimilation may
notonlybe due to declining quality ofsubsequentimmigrantcohorts butcouldas well
be causedbyincreasingqualityofnativecohortswhichareusedasacomparisongroup.
Thisismuchlesslikelytobeimportantbutcanbehandledalongsimilarlines. However,
allowing for differep.tial earnings growth across native cohorts will make it harder to
define a base level which to compare immigrantearnings growth to when calculating
assimilation rates.
6Time Effects
While it seems from the discussion ofcohort effects that panel or pseudo-panel data
are the way out ofthe identification dilemma in a single cross section this is far from
the truth. While panel data allow us to partial out cohort effects the additional time
dimension confounds the estimates by introducing possible time effects. While it is
impossible to distinguish age and cohort effects in a cross section it is impossible to
distinguish (the linear portion of) age, cohort and time effects in a panel.
Thesimplestidentifyingassumptionisthattimeeffectshavethesameimpactonnatives
and immigrants. In this case we can write the time effect as tt. The model is now
(5)
Fora single cross section, construct predicted wages for natives and immigrants with
similarcharacteristics and take differences between the two groups yielding
(6)
\
Thetime effects have been sweptout by this comparisonbecause they affectmigrants
and natives similarly. Now form differences withthe corresponding variables for the
same cohortfrom anothercross section.
~2c = (Y met+l - Y net+1) - (ymet - Y net) (7)
This difference-in-difference estimatoridentifies the assimilation coefficient. 2 Ithas
been applied by Borjas (1985) and various researchers after him.
Lalonde and Topel (1990) point out that the assumption of equal time effects is
dangerous, however. The earnings distribution in the U.S. has widened inthe 1970to
1980 period commonly studied with higher wage growth accruing at the top and less
at the bottom ofthe distribution. Figure 3 exhibits the problem that will arise in this
context. Itassumesthatanimmigrantentersatthe25thpercentileofthe ~ativeearnings
distributionin 1970. Whilea nativeinthispositionexhibitslittleornoearningsgrowth
the immigrants earnings grow substantially putting her in the 40th percentile of the
native distribution in 1980, say. Because the distribution has widened no catching up
2) This is the same es\imator as in equation (4).
7tothemediannativehasoccured. Still,wewouldconcludethatassimilationhasoccured
ifwecomparetheimmigrantspositionin 1980andthepositionwewouldhavepredicted
from the earnings dynamics ofa comparable native.
Inourmodel this effect ofa widening earnings distribution canbe captured by a time
effectthathas anindividual specificloadingfactor, i.e. 'tit = AjVt • Ofcourse, the Ajhave
to berestrictedinanappropriate wayto identify themodel. Lalonde andTopel assume
thattheseloadingfactors areafunctionofthepositioninthenativeearnings distribution
forboth immigrants and natives. This is akin to saying that time effects influence the
eamihgs ofimmigrants ina similar way as they affect a native ina similarposition in
the earnings distribution. Lalonde and Topel fmd this effect, ifnot accounted for, to
bias the assimilation rate of recent Mexican immigrants downward by 8 percentage
points over the 1970-1980 period. This type ofbias is unlikely to be a problem for
Gennandata sincethe wagedistributionhas beenvery similarovertime (see Abraham
and Houseman, 1992).
AgeatEntry
Friedberg (1991) has addressed the obvious possibility that the earnings disadvantage
offoreigners may depend on the age when they enter the host country. Ifsuch age
effects exist and are not controlled for, then estimates of assimilation rates will in
general be biased. As Friedberg points out, this is due to the fact that in any sample
oflabor force participants age at arrival and years since migration will be negatively
correlatedbecauseoffinite working lifes. A migrantwhohas beeninthe hostcountry
for a long time musthave enteredvery young, otherwise she wouldbe retired.
The effect of age at entry can be identified together with cohort effects on two




separately. Notice,however, thatthe estimationofthe assimilationrate is again based
on a difference-in-difference estimator as in equation (7). Hence, Borjas' estimates,
bysweeping outall timeinvarianteffects, identifythe assimilationrate correctly,even
ifage-at-entry effects are present. However, his estimates of cohort effects will be
biased.
Friedberg finds that earnings drop on average by 0.5 percent for every year the
immigran~is olderat entry. This estimate varies by source country; age matters least
8for Europeans' and becomes "most important for Asians. She also finds sizeable
assimilation rates but little evidence ofan overall drop in cohort quality, although the
earnings ofEuropean and Hispanic immigrants have decreased for later cohorts.
Remigration
We will now have to take a closer look at the error structure in our initial model.
Disregard age and cohort effects again but assume that individual effects are an
important factor in the determination ofearnings. This raises a new potential source
ofbias thatmay l~ad us to overestimate assimilationrates: the possibilitythat different
types ofworkers have different propensities to remigrate. Borjas (1989) investigated
the possibility that more successful migrants stay while the ones who perform badly
return to theirhome countries ormigrate elsewhere. Migrants who leave willnot tum
up in the Census anymore so thatthe sample ofmigrants willtendto consistofworkers
of increasingly better quality. Thus a high YSMit will imply a high value of j.tj on
average. This simultaneity due to the sorting mechanism will bias the coefficient ~2
upwards. In fact, it is possible to find apparent assimilation ifthere is actually none
for every individual worker.
As long as the sorting takes place onlyontheearnings level,theproblemcanbesolved
straightforwardlyusing a within-estimatoronpanel data. Borjas (1989) analyzes data
from a two periodpanel onscientists and engineers. Whilethereis someevidence that
the femigrants have lower earnings than the stayers, this does ,not seem to lead tQ a
marked upward bias in the estimate of the assimilation rate. Notice that repeated
cross-sections do not solve this problem since the sorting will generally happen at the
individual level and thus affect cohort averages.
Immigrantsortingdue to remigrationmaybe positive as wellas negative. In particular
in the German context, it may be more reasonable that guestworkers who have done
well andaccumulatedenoughfinancial assets orhumancapital will returnfirst to start
a new career in their home country. The less successfulmigrants may stay onwaiting
for their big hit, orbecause they do not want to return home looking like a failure, or
to benefit from the more generous social insurance system in Germany. However, if
the target level ofsuccess that induces remigration depends not only on jnnate ability
butalsoonchangesinincomethenevenwithin-estimatesofassimilationmaybebiased.
Say all guestworkers wantto save a target level before returninghome. The longerthe
tenure ofa guestworkerin the host country the more likely is that shehas hadbadluck
in the most recent years when close to the target. Thus, years since migration will be
negativelycorrelatedwith Ejt yielding anunderestimateoftheassimilationrate. Since
thereis very little observedremigrationinthe SOEPthis is unlikelyto beabigproblem
(see Licht and Steiner, 1992b).
9Estimating Assimilation with Panel Data
Mostoftheissuesthathavepreoccupiedthe literatureonassimilationinthe U.S. would
not have arisen in the same way if true panel data on a representative sample of
foreigners wasavailable. Cohorteffectsandeffectsdueto ageatentrycanbeeliminated
by using a within-estimator. This would also reduce the potential bias from selective
remigration if it is related to the level of earnings. Ifmigrants leave because their
assimilation rate is lower than for the stayers then sweeping out fixed effects will still
notyieldunbiasedestimatesoftheassimilationrate. However,ifmigrantsareobserved
to leave the panel, estimates can be obtained separately for different subgroups of
migrants according to their length ofstay. 3
The use ofa within-estimatorhas its cost. All cross-sectional information is lost. The
effects of experience and duration of stay for foreigners cannot separately be
distinguished within the sample for immigrants. Hence, the experience profile of
natives will have toserve as the base over which we measure any difference in the
increase in the wages offoreigners as assimilation. Furthermore, once we allow for
experience, independent time effects cannot be identified anymore. As long as time
effects affect foreigners and natives alike they will only confound the estimate of Clz,
the coefficient onexperience butnot the estimate ofthe assimilation rate. Obviously
the problem is just analogous to the c.ohort data context and similar identifying
assumptions are possible.
It might be ofinterest to have estimates ofthe parameters other than the assimilation
rate as well. Forexample, the initialearnings gap betweenforeigners andnativesmay _
beofinterestto putthe estimatedassimilationrates into perspective. Ingeneral, itwill
not be possible to obtain consistent estimates of these parameters if years since
migration is correlated with the error term. To apply the strategy of Hausman and
Taylor(1981) timevarying regressorsuncorrelatedwiththe fixedeffectare necessary.
Itis hard to think ofsuch variables. Consistent estimates ofthe assimilation rate can
beobtained(underthe assumptions ofa correlatedindividualeffect)from pooledcross
section data by instrumenting years since migration by deviations from person means
as AltonjiandShakotko(1987)haveobserved. However,here thereis nopresumption
that cohort effects are not present. Notice that in a balanced panel cohort effects and
mean years since migration are linearly dependent. Altonji and Shakotko's estimator




3) This is the strategy BOljas (1989) follows.
10I will therefore report a variety ofpooled cross section results in the hope that these
willnot be affectedby strong inconsistencies. Before turning to the regression results
I will give a description ofthe sample used.
3 Foreign Workers in the Socio Economic Panel
The data usedin this study are the first six waves ofthe SocioEconomicPanel ofWest
Germany (SOEP). This household panel is patterned after the American Panel Study
ofIncome Dynamics and has been conducted annually since 1984. Contrary to most
longitudinalhouseholddatasets intheU.S. the SOEPoversamplesforeignhouseholds.
Ofthe 6,000 households in the dataset are 1,600 foreign households.
The suhsample of immigrants is not representative of the foreign population in
Germany. Rather,thefive mostimportantcountriesoforiginwere chosenforinclusion
in the sample. For each country a random sample ofroughly equal size was drawn.
The five countries are Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, Italy, and Spain. These countries
oforigin accounted for75 percentofthe foreigners inGermanyin 1984; theproportion
has only declined mildly since: They make up the traditional guestworkerpopulation
in Germany.
The analysis that follows will be limited to males. For this group, figure 4 plots the
distribution of the foreign subsample in the extract I used from SOEP and the
comparable distribution among all workers in jobs covered by the social security
system.
4 The figure shows that the survey distribution differs somewhat from the
population distribution. Turks,'the largest population group, are underrepresented
while Greeks and Spaniards are overrepresented in the sample.
I drew a sample ofworkers aged 18 to 65 who reported to work full time and worked
actuallymore than 25 hours inthe currentweek. Earnings referto the previous month;
Iadded one twelvthofannual bonus payments for the previous yearanddeflatedthem
to 1985 Marks. Observations with an implied hourly wage rate below 4 Marks and
over 150 Marks an hour were deleted. Finally, I kept observations with complete
records on the covariates and required that everybody worked for at least two periods
between 1982 and 1989. This allows me to use a consistent sample for cross-section
as well as for panel analyses. The sample consists of2,976 individuals, 858 ofwhom
are foreigners. On average, individuals appearin the sample in 5.0periods yielding a
total sample size of 13,540 (3,749 foreigners).
4) This excludes main~y low paying part-time employment.
11Inthe remainderofthis section I will describe some features ofthe foreign population
in this sample. One of the key variables to study assimilation is the year of arrival.
Figure 5 plots this variable for the entire sample as well as by country oforigin. The
sample reflects important institutional features ofthe German policy with respect to
foreign workers. 5 Guestworkers started to enter Germany in the late fifties and were
actively recruitedthroughoutthe sixties andearly seventies whenlabormarkets where
tight. Recruitmentwas haltedinDecemberof1973 as a response to the changing labor
marketconditions. Inflowsfromthefivesamplingcountrieshavedropped;signigicantly
and le~eled offto date.
This implies that most ofthe sample members will have been inGermany for fifteen
years orso at the beginning ofthe sampling period. Forthe study ofassimilation this
is rather problematic since for such an "old" group ofimmigrants much ofthe initial
process of catching up may be over. The figure also reveals that there are distinct
differencesbetweennationsoforigin. Turks areamongthe morerecentarrivals,having
been in Germany for 15.0 years on average. Greeks a~ the oldest group with 19.6
years since arrival.
Figure 6 plots the ages ofguestworkers when they arrived inGermany. It reveals that
most workers enter in their twenties. This is true for all ofthe sending countries; in
fact, differencesmaybemostlydue to samplingvariation. YugoslavsandGreeks tend
to be slightly older, Italians and Spaniards younger.
ThecomplexityoftheGermaneducationalsystemposesthe usualproblemsincreating
suitablemeasures for the level ofschooling. Educational attainment by Germans and _
foreigners inthe SOEPis codedthrongha variety ofvariables. ForGermans there are
two questions about the highest degree taken in secondary school as well as for
vocational and other post-secondary training completed. For foreigners there is
additionalinformation onschooling and training obtainedintheirhome country,even
ifno degrees where received.
Fromthe sUlVey informationIconstructedtwomeasuresofeducation,yearsofprimary
and secondary schooling and years ofpost-secondary training. The former is,rather
simple to define since the various secondary degrees are usually reached in a fixed
number ofyears. The training variable poses more problems since the same type of
training canbeofvariable length. Forexample, apprenticeships lastfrom two to over
three years, depending onthe trade and the previous degree ofthe apprentice. See the
appendix for details on the assignments.
Despite rathercomplexeducational systems inmany southern European countries the
information on the schooling offoreigners is limited. The questionnaire allows for
three answers: less than compulsory, completed compulsary, and higher schooling.
Training is coded in more detail: none, some mstruction on the job, formal
5) See for example Franz (1991) and McRae (1981) for details and additional statistics.
12apprenticeship, vocational school, university, and other. Converting these into years
posestheproblemthatmanyofthe countries requireratherlongapprenticeshipperiods.
These should not be considered primarily an instruction, but the apprentice serves as
cheap unskilled labor. This is true, for example, for the traditional Turkish system,
where an apprenticeship lasts five years, see Kiihn (1987). The idea is to apportion
only the number of years that corespond to actual training. I made -- admittedly --
somewhat arbitrary assignments, see again the appendix for details.
Using these assignments,figures 7 and 8display the levels ofschoolingforthe various
countries andshowthe markeddifferences betweenGermans andforeigners. Germans
have 9.9 years of schooling on average and an additonal 2.0 years oftraining, that is
almost 12 years ofeducation. Foreigners have 6.1 years offoreign schooling plus 1.3
years in Germany. They also received 0.6 years of training in their home countries
plus 0.2 years in Germany. There are considerable differences between the countries,
Turks tend to have more German schooling and training. This is presumably mostly
accounted for by the children ofthe immigrants who entered Germany young enough
to receive some oftheir education in the host country.
Given that foreign guestworkers in Germany have comparatively little training they
will not be able to enter the same types of professions as the average German. The
following table shows the types ofjobsGermans andforeigners occupy in the sample.
Types ofJobs Held by Germans and Guestworkers
(in percent)
Type ofJob Germans Foreigners
unskilled workefl) 4.3 21.5
semiskilled worker 12.5 46.7
skilled worker 20.8 21.0
master craftsman 7.9 4.3
selfemployed 7.0 3.4







Notes: a) including low level white collar positions
b) einfacher Dienst
c) mittlerer to hOherer Dienst
13 Bib Ii o,thek
~M In~itllt~ fiir W~lhAJiri~rhft"There are extremely striking differences inthe types ofjobs occupiedby Germans and
foreigners. Almostall guestworkers (more than 90percent)holdblue collarpositions,
thetypes ofjobsthey wereoriginallyrecruitedfor. Withinthis group two thirds occupy
unskilled and semi-skilled positions while German blue collar workers tend to
concentrate in the skilled jobs. However, 21 percent ofthe foreigners do skilled jobs
andfourpercenthaveadvancedto mastercraftsmenorforemen. Hardly any foreigners
hold any white collarand public service positions while about halfofthe Germans are
in suchjobs. Self-employment rates are also lower among the foreignet:s.6
Sinceforeigners fill theiobs on the bottom ofthe occupational hierarchy it comes as
no surprise,that they have lower earnings than Germans on average. The following
table displays monthly earnings in the sample for the various nationalities.
Gross Monthly Earnings ofGermans and Guestworkers
(Marks)
Nation oforigin Mean in percent of Log standard
Germans deviation
Germany 4189 100 0.389
Turkey 3064 73 0.249
Yugoslavia 3386 81 0.266
Greece 3190 76 0.263
Italy 3077 73 0.249
Spain 3127 75 0.271
Germans make 4200 Marks a month. All guestworker groups are below this level,
mostlybya substantialamount. Yugoslavsmake"only" 19 percentless thanGermans.
Recallthatthey are alsothe groupwiththe highest leveloftraining. Turks and Italians
are atthe bottomofthe rankingwitha27 percentdifferential, they make less than3100
Marks.
The last column ofthe table reveals that there is also a susbstantial difference in the
dispersionofearnings within the nationalities. The income ofGermans is much more
dispersed than that ofguestworkers. Figure 9 reveals that this is due to the fact that
the earnings distribution offoreigners is missing the right tail present for Germans.
6) However, selfemployedforeigners seem to be rather successful in Germany, see Seifert
(1991), although this resultrests on very smallcell sizes. Bothfacts, lower self-employmentrates
and relative success would be in contrastto the U.S. where foreigners are more often
self-employed than natives but earn less. See BOIjas (1990a), chapter 10.
14Practically no foreigners earn monthly wages above 5000 Marks while a fair number
ofGermans do. Theuppertail is, ofcourse, associatedwithqualifiedwhite collarjobs
andhigherlevelpublic sectorpositions. These are the positions foreigners hardlyever
fill. Figure 10 makes this clear by limiting the sample to workers in unskilled and
semi-skilled jobs. For this subsample the earnings distributions do not differ much
between Germans and foreigners.
This theme, that foreigners differ from the average German mainly because they fill
the unskilled blue collar jobs, will occupy us again below in the estimation of
assimilation rat~s of guestworkers in Germany. It is these estimates that we tum to
now.
4 The Assimilation ofGuestworkers in Germany
The availableevidence seems to show that there is at leastsome degree ofassimilation
offoreign immigrants inthe U.S., eventhoughthe assimilationratemay be lowerthan
theinitialestimatesbyChiswick(1978). Thefew econometricanalysesofassimilation
for Germany have produced lower but still positive assimiation rates, see Dustmann
(1990) and Licht and Steiner (1992b).
Pooled Cross-Section Results
Table 1presents a series ofGLS random effects estimates onthe pooled sample from
1984 to 1989.
7 Column 1 is a standard earnings regression with schooling and
experience as controls. Additionally, as in the studies by Chiswick and Dustmann,
years since migration are included as a quadratic in the regression. For simplicity, I
will call the estimates on these variables "assimilation" despite the fact that they will
capture numerous effects, recall the discussion in section 2. The estimate for the
assimilation rate at entry is 0.1 percent. This rate increases over time, so that the
cumulative effect amounts to 3.5 percent after 10 years inGermany. This is only 25
percentofChiswick's estimates and slightly less than Dustmann's. 8 The quadratic in
years since migration is significant; a Wald-test for joint significance is reported on
the bottom ofthe table.
7) The computations follow Hsiao (1986, pp. 194-196) with the only difference that the
estimated variance components are adjusted for degrees offreedom. This yielded much more
satisfactory results in a small monte carlo study.
8) Dustmann (1990) only used the 1984 wave in his analysis. Estimated assimilation rates are
highe~ for the 1984 cros~-section than for most later years.
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Since the specification allows for differential returns to schooling in Gennany and
immigrantshomecountries computingthe initialearnings gapofforeigners is notquite
straightforward. The last row shows estimates ofthis earnings gap for an immigrant
who had the same number of years of schooling in his home country as an average
Gennan. Additional assumptions in later regressions are that the immigrant is from
Yugoslavia, entered in 1970 (the median entry year in the sample), at an age of 24.1
years (the average it). the sample). Mostimmigrants have considerably less schooling
than Gennans and
6
Iower earnings than Yugoslavs. Hence, most actu~l immigrants
would have experienced an even greater earnings gap. In the basic specification the
assumed immi'grant wouldhave received 35 percent less than a comparable Gennan.
However,the following column~ show that the initial result is nottoo robust. Column
2 adds period dummies, capturing general wage growth over time. This makes the
initial assimilation rate negative. The initial earnings gap is now smaller because
immigrantspositiondeteriorates overtime. Experienceprofiles becomeflatteras well.
Adding age at immigration has little effect on the e§timated assimilation rates.
Furthennore,higherageatimmigrationincreasesearnings,theoppositeofwhatwould
be expected from flatter experience profiles in immigrants home countries. But the
effect is small and insignificant. Adding nation ofbirth effects has again little little
impacton the results.
Thefirst columnintable 2 adds cohortdummies to the regression. Cohortqualitymay
be deteriorating slightly leading to even more negative assimilation rates. However,
theassimilationrates as well as the cohorteffects are notas welldetenninedany more.
This comes as no surprise whenwe recall that we try to estimate these effects jointly
for a sample offoreigners who entered over a 40 year period with a six year panel.
Thus, cleanly disentangling these effects in the pooled cross-sections is rather
unrealistic.
Thenext columnadds type ofjob dummies. Jobs are classified in eight categories as
in the previous section. This regression checks whether there is assimilation within
thesejob categories, i.e. absent any changes intohigher level jobs. Such changes are
actually relatively rare for foreigners as well as for Gennans. 9 Again the difference
to the previous results is slight. Expe~ence profiles as well as assimilation rates are
very similarwithinjob categories. The initial earnings gap foranunskilled workeris
slightly lower.
9) See the paper by Seifert (1991) on this issue.
16Panel Estimates
As the discussionabove indicatedthere are goodreasons to be suspicious ofthe pooled
cross section results despite various controls like cohort and age at entry effects. The
lasttwo columns oftable 2showcomparablefixed effects estimates,overall and within
jobtypes. Again the results are only marginally different from the previous estimates
thus indicating that factors like selective remigration may not be very important in
influencing these estimates.
Estimated assimilation rates, though insignificant, still show a V-shaped profile with
the position offoreigners deteriorating in the initial years. Ifsuch an effect is indeed
present this does not mean actually declining earnings for the foreigners inthe sample
but rather lower earnings growth than for Germans. Various conjectures about this
phenomenon come to mind. Differentialtime effects forGermans andforeigners may
be an explanation. While the German economy was booming during the years the
panel refers to this was the recovery from the severe recession in the early eighties.
The recovery may not have affected all groups in society at the same rates.
Unemployment throughout the eighties remained at historically high levels.
Disadvantagedgroups, among them many foreigners, mayhave still suffered from the
aftermath ofthe recession even ifthey had jobs. Thus the pattern may be dominated
by effects that'have nothing to do with assimilation. Another explanation is that, on
average, foreigners tend to hold jobs with lower rates ofearnings growth as natives.
I will return to this issue shortly. '
The results differ from the ones obtained by Licht and Steiner (1992b) who also
calculate fixed effects estimates for a comparable sample. They found positive
assimilation rates ofinitially about 1percent, or 8 percent during the first 10 years in
Germany. However, they use actual work experience by Germans and foreigners as
regressors and instrument these variables by potential experience. They also control
for selective participation in the labor market. Since unemployment spells are
connected with losses in subsequent earnings (see Licht and Steiner, 1992a) the
differencesmayemergefromthehigherincidenceofunemploymentamongforeigners.
Before turning to some different subgroups ofthe sample, let us take a brief look at
someoftheothercoefficientsintheseregressions. Theyarepresentedintable3together
withvariable'means. Column3repeats the baselineregressionwithallcontrols except
job types (Le. it repeats column 1 in table 2). Cohort effects are decreasing slightly
overtimebuttheyarenotlargeinmagnitude. Thereare somecleardifferencesbetween
the nationalities. Yugoslavs perform best, Spaniards worst. The other countries lie
inbetween and do not differ much. We will see below that the relatively good
performance ofthe Yugoslavs has to do with their bettereducation.
17~ Resultsfor Immigrant Subgroups
Table 4 tackles the problem oftrying to sort out some ofthe issues alluded to above.
The first problem is that the sample of foreigners is dominated by the group with a
relatively long residence inGermany (the meanis 17 years). Assimilation effects may
be low for this group while othereffects confoundthe estimates. The early years after
entry may instead be the most crucial in the assimilation process. Col~ 2 in table
4 excludes all immigrants who entered before 1977. Foreigners in this sample have
thus at most a tenure of 12 years in Germany. The cost of this exercise is ofcourse
the loss ofmost(observations on immigrants. In fact, their share in the sample drops
from 28 percentto 3percent or317 observations. Because ofthe small cell sizes Ihad
to exclude nation dummies from the specification. Still, standard errors on the years
since migration effect surge. But the assimilation profile is now positive and
assimilationeffects are (potentially) huge. Immigrants' earnings growth exceeds that
ofGermansby5.5 percentatentryor2ipercentafter 10 years. Almostall this catching
up occurs within the first 5 years in Germany. However, the initial gap inearnings
which results from extrapolating this profile to the time at entry is now a huge 50
percent. Mtera few years inGermany the earnings gap is back to the level ofaround
25 percent I have been finding throughout this study.
Column 3 takes a different approach by changing the comparison group ofGermans:
onlyunskilledandsemi-skilledworkers are includedinthe sample. These are the most
important job types foreigners occupy; they make up 61 percent of this subsample.
There is againnoevidence thatforeigners' earnings profiles differat all from those of
Germans in this group. Furthermore, there is almost no initial earnings gap between
immigrants and Germans in this group. This implies that the observed differences
between immigrants and Germans stem largely from the different composition ofthe
respectivesamples. Germansarefarmorelikelyto holdwellpaidwhitecollarpositions,
requiringhighereducation. Thesejobsimply steeperearningsprofiles whichis visible
fromthedifferencesforthecoefficientsonexperienceincolumns 1and3. Thisexplains
the slightly negative assimilation rates in the full sample.
This regression yields some other notable results (which are not shown in the table).
ThereturnstoeducationaremuchlowerforthisgroupanddifferencesbetweenGerman
andforeigneducationareattenuated. Theseresults arenotverysurprisingfOf unskilled
jobs. They show that some ofthe difference between German and foreign education
are not accountedfor by the quality ofinstruction butratherby the fact thatforeigners
tend to hold jobs in which formal training is not rewarded. The effect of age at
immigration is now negative.
Most interestingly, the absence of an assimilation profile is now accompanied by a
strongerpattern oflower earnings for subsequent cohorts. The earnings ofpost-1980
arrivals are 15 percentbelow the earnings ofguestworkers entering before 1960. Note
that !he estimated cohort effects are unbiased under the null hypothesis of no
18assimilation. Whatexplainsthestrongnegativetrendincohortquality? Oneconjecture
is related to the migration behavior offamilies. Much ofthe post 1973 immigration
from the guestworkercountries is presumablyfamily reunification. Ifafamily decides
not to migrate together in one step they will send their most productive member first
(seeBorjasandBronars, 1990b). Aftersomeexperienceinthehostcountrythe migrant
may decide to return home to his family or, in the case of success in the new labor
market, have the familyjoin. Thus, laterimmigrants willonaverage be less productive
than the earlierones. This is especially true ifan additional sorting process has taken
place with only successful initial migrants appearing in the sample.
The last columnrepeats the sameexercise for skilledand unskilled blue collarworkers
(excluding foremen). This yields results very similarto the previous columnbut with
a slightly higher estimate ofthe assimilation rate and again a widening ofthe initial
earnings gap. In conclusion, foreigners do not tend to do worse or have different
earnings profiles than comparable natives, meaning Germans in similar jobs. The




Ifforeigners do notassimilatethenitbecomes amorecrucialquestionwhytheyoccupy
alowerpositionin the earningsdistributioninitially. Theprimecandidateis, ofcourse,
the educational attainment offoreigners. The last table allows a closer look at this
determinantofthewagesofiInmigrants. Column3intable5presentsagainthebaseline
specification with results shown for the education variables. Education is broken up
into years ofschooling and years of ~raininginGermany andabroad. The first striking
·result is the very different return to schooling and post-secondary training. An
additional year ofthe former adds 4 percent to wages while a yearofthe latterhas an
effect of 11 percent. Returns to schooling abroad show the same general pattern but
are much lower. The return to foreign schooling is basically zero, while a year of
training yields 3 percent more in earnings.
Column 4 includes an interaction ofGerman schooling with foreigner. Now, returns
to schooling and training for Germans are very similar: about 8 per,cent each. For
foreigners the picture is very different. An additional year ofschooling inGermany
yields just 1.5 percent higherearnings. Returns to training, on,the otherhand, are the
same as for Germans. The results above already gave a hint that this does not mean
thateducationis valued less becauseimmigrants are foreigners butratherbecausethey
tend to enterjobs where education is not very important.
19The final column breaks down the returns to education further by nation of origin.
Years of schooling are equally unimportant for all sending countries. The picture is
very different for training. Here, Yugoslavs receive a return of 6.5 percent for an
additional year of qualification. The Yugoslav vocational training system is of
relatively high quality. In fact, among all guestworker groups, Yugoslavs were most
likely to have their training certificates accepted as equivalent to the completion ofa
Germanapprenticeship(seeMcRae, 1981). RecallthatYugoslavsalsohavethe highest
level oftraining, about twice as much as all the other nationalities. Greek and Italian
workers also receive rel~tively high returns to their training, about 5 percent. The
training ofTurkish and Spanish workers is not valued at all in Germany. Obviously,
the differential effects of training for different guestworker groups account for the




This paperdiscusses the identificationofassimilationrates forimmigrant workers and
presents a series ofresults for guestworkers in Germany. The analysis draws on the
Socioeconomic Panel thatoversamples the importantgroups inthe foreign population
in Germany. Panel data have a distinct advantage in estimating dynamic effects due
to assimilation: potentialbiases due to correlated individual effects may be controlled
for. Sources for such biases have been discussed at length in the U.S. literature on
assimilation: cohort effects, the role ofage at entry, selective remigration, etc. Most
ofthese effects are easily eliminated by allowing for individual specific effects. My
estimates showthatfixedeffects results do notdiffermuchfrom cross sectionfindings
using the standard controls that have been suggested in the American literature. In
most specifications, assimilation effects are basically zero oreven slightly negative.
While panel data onindividuals are desirable to provide bettercontrols for individual
effects they also pose theirownproblems. Inthe present case one ofthe fundamental
problems is thatthe populationofforeigners sampled mostly enteredGermany before
1974 while the sample only starts in 1984. Thus, the foreigners in the sample have
alreadybeeninGermanyfora longtimeandassimilationeffectsmaynotbe particular
stronganymore. Usingaquadraticin years sincemigrationmaynotidentify the slope
ofthe assimilation profile in the first few years but might be dominated by the slope
andcwvatureoftheearnings profileofolderimmigrants. I presentsomeevidencethat
estimatednegativeassimilationrates ratherreflect lowerearningsgrowthinbluecollar
positions as they are typically occupied by guestworkers.
20Thesecondproblemisthemaintainedassumptionthattimeeffectsinfluenceforeigners
and natives alike. While there is no secular widening of the wage distribution in
Germany as inmany other western economies, differential business cycle effects may
be present. This is a problem that needs additional attention.
Given these caveats, it turns out that there is no earnings gap or differential earnings
growthbetweenforeigners andGermansincomparabletypes ofjobs. Ifanydifferential
earnings growth takes place it is concentrated in the first five or at most ten years in
the host country. However, since this resultis basedonmore recent arrivals andmight
notholdforthe oldergroups ofguestworkers who enteredduring aperiodoftightlabor
markets in the 60s.
In the U.S. literatureearnings gaps have oftenbeencomputedbetween recentmigrants
and immigrants ofthe same origin who have been in the V.S. for 30 years or so, see
Borjas (1985) andLalonde andTopel (1990). Ifsubsequentimmigrantcohortsoccupy
similar jobs this will also tend to eliminate between job effects. However, these
estimates show that recent immigrants enterwith a substantial earnings disadvantage.
( In this sense, foreign workers are betterprotected against low wages inGermany than
in the V.S. This may be a factor why Germany tends to attract only immigrants with
relatively low skills. ,
Such a selection would be consistent with the argument proposed by Borjas (1987).
His story goes in terms ofthe type ofimmigrants a receiving country liketheV.S. can
expect to draw from different sending nations. Based on the idea of Roy (1954),
immigrants from countries withmoredispersedopportunities.thanthe receivingnation
will benegatively self-selectedon average. The oppositeis trueforcountries withless
dispersed opportunities. The self-selection argument can equally be employed to the
situation ofa sending country. A highly skilled Italian will benefitmost by migrating
to a nation with high returns to skill, like the V.S. An unskilled Italian will be better
offto migrate to a country where minimum wages are relatively high, like Germany.
Thus, Germany will be most attractive to the bottom ofthe skill distribution among
international migrants while better qualified migrants will choose countries like the
V.S. orCanada.
Absent any assimilation, the question arises what determines the initial position of
immigrants. There seem to be substantial differences inearnings among the different
nationalities in Germany. These are related to the quality and quantity ofvocational
training the immigrants received. Sincemost foreigners are likely to stay inGermany
permanent!y,this alsopointsto theimportanceofadditionaleducationfortheirupward
mobility. This will be especially important for the second (and thrird) generation of
foreigners which is still almost fully excluded from highereducation and white collar
positions.
However, the economic position of guestworkers should not be undervalued either.
The foreigners who have decided to stay in Germany are most likely better off
economically than they were in their home countries. During the depression ofthe
early eighties, the German government offered to pay returning foreigners the cash
21value oftheir social security claims. This offerhas not beenattractiveenoughformost
guestworkers to induce them to return home. With gross monthly earnings of 3200
Marks th~ average foreigner is still much better off than the average East German.
However, much is to be done to accomplish a better social and political integration of
the foreigners.
22Appendix: Coding ofthe Schooling and Training Variables
Years ofschoolingandyears oftraining are codedinthe following way. Forschooling
inGermany9years wereassumedforbasicsecondaryschool(Hauptschule),forspecial
schools, and ifno degree was received, 10 years for middle school (Realschule), 12
years for the entry exam to technical colleges (Fachhochschulreife), and 13 years for
the university entry exam (Abitur). Training was coded in the following way.
Apprenticeships were assumed to last 3 years half of which is work experience, half
ofwhich is training, so 1.5 years were coded. Since apprenticeships can be shortened
for those who finished additional years ofsecondary school, only 1yearwas assumed
for everybody past grade 10 in school. 2 years were assumed for vocational school
(Berufsfachschule) and 1.5 years for the training of nurses. Technical schools
(Fachschulen) last for one ortwo years beyond a completed apprenticeship so that 1.5
years were added to the apprenticeship training. Trainingofpublicservants was coded
as 1.5 years. Technical college (Fachhochschule) is assumedto last4 years, university
5 years. Other training was coded as 2 years.
Years ofEducation Assigned for theGuestworkerCountries
Type ofEducation Turkey Yugoslavia Greece Italy Spain
Less than cumpulsory 4 7 8 7 7
Compulsory school 5 8 9 8 8
More than compulsory 8 11 12 12 11
On-the-job instruction 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Apprenticeship 1 I 1 1 1
Vocational school 2 2 2 2 2
University 7 4 4 5 4
Other training 2 2 2 2 2
Educationinforeign countrieswas codedaccordingtothefollowingtable. Inthecodes
for years ofschooling I followed the sUlvey ofschool systems by Schultze (1969). He
gives information on the years of compulsory schooling, I subtracted one year for
everybodywhoreportednottocompletecompulsoryschool. Formorethancompulsory
schooling, I used the typical level beyond compulsory school to leave the secondary
schoolsystem. Inallcountries exceptTurkeyandItaly,thisisalso the levelthatallows
access to university. .
23Since Ihave insufficientinfonnationonthevocational training systems inthe separate
countries, I have coded years oftraining consistently for all ofthem according to the
table. NoticethatIhadto addfurther yearsofsecondaryschoolforuniversitygraduates
inTurkey and Italy.
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26Table 1
Earnings Regressions for Immigrants and Natives
(standard errors in parentheses)
independent variable GLS GLS GLS GLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
experience 0.044 0.037 0.037 0.037
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
experience
2/l00 -0.066 -0.061 -0.061 -0.061
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
YSM 0.0013 -0.0031 -0.0032 -0.0036
(0.0049) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0048)
YSM
2/lOO 0.0227 0.0145 0.0151 0.0039
(0.0137) (0.0135) (0.0135) (0.0136)
age at immigration -- -- 0.0014 0.0013
(0.0014) (0.0014)
5 period dummies -- yes yes yes
4 nation ofbirth dummies -- -- -- yes
7 cohortdummies -- -- -- --
7 dummies for jobtypes -- -- -- --
R
2 0.322 0.354 0.355 0.356
std. dev. ofindividual effect 0.268 0.268 0.268 0.268
std. dev. ofnoise 0.156 0.151 0.151 0.151
Wald-Test for significance of 24.01 1.50 1.60 1.63
YSMand YSM
2 [0.000] [0.472] [0.449] [0.442]
[p-value]
assimilation: 0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.014
first 5 years (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
first 10 years . 0.035 -0.016 -0.017 -0.020
(0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036)
initial earnings gap -0.327 -0.225 -0.229 -0.190
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.049)
Notes: Data are from the first six waves ofthe German Socio-Economic Panel. Sampleconsists
ofmales aged 18-65 who were full-time employed at the time ofthe survey. Sample size is
13,540. Dependent variable is log monthly earnings plus one twelves ofaimual bonuses.
Regressors also include a constant, a dummy for foreigners, and four variables for years of
schooling and training in Germany and abroad.
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Table 2
Earnings Regressions for Immigrants and Natives
(standard errors in parentheses)
independent variable GLS GLS Fixed Effects Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
experience 0.037 0.035 0.049 0.048
" (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005)
experience
2/100 -0.061 -0.058 -0.055 -0.054
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
YSM -0.0050 -0.0038 -0.0067 -0.0069
(0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0058) (0.0058)
YSM
2/100 0.0172 0.0120 0.0193 0.0201
(0.0152) (0.0151) - (0.0160) (0.0159)
age at immigration 0.0013 0.0013 -- --
(0.0014) (0.0013)
period dummies 5 5 4 4
4 nation ofbirth dummies yes yes -- --
7 cohortdummies yes yes -- --
7 dummies for jobtypes -- yes -- yes
R
2 0.356 0.419 0.133- 0.141-
std. dev. ofindividual effect 0.268 0.249 -- --
std. dev. ofnoise 0.151 0.152 0.151 0.152
Wald-Test for significance of 0.74 0.33 0.73 0.80
YSMand YSM
2 [0.690] [0.850] [0.695] [0.671]
[p-value]
assimilation: -0.021 -0.016 -0.029 -0.030
frrst 5 years (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025)
first 10 years -0.033 -0.026 -0.047 -0.049
(0.041) (0.041) (0.043) (0·943)







Earnings Regressions for Immigrants and Natives: Details
(standard errors in parentheses)
independent variable means means GLS
(foreigners)
(1) (2) (3)
experience 24.8 26.7 0.037
(0.002)
experience
2/100 -- -- -0.061
- (0.003)
YSM 4.79 17.3 -0.0050
(0.0055)
YSM
2/100 -- -- 0.0172
(0.0152)
age at immigration 6.7 24.1 0.0013
(0.0014)
1985 0.19 0.19 -0.106
(0.006)
1986 0.19 0.19 -0.104
(0.006)
1987 0.17 0.17 -0.071
(0.005)
1988 0.16 0.16 -0.043
(0.005)




independent variable means means
(foreigners)
(1) (2) (3)
entered before 60 0.016 0.06 0.002
(0.051)
entered 61-64 0.047 0.17 0.014
(0.035)
entered 65-67 0.023 0.08 -0.040
- (0.040)
entered 68-69 0.020 0.07 0.003
(0.041)
entered 72-73 0.071 0.26 -0.027
(0.028)
entered 74-79 0.028 0.10 -0.018
(0.041)
entered after 80 0.009 0.03 -0.056
(0.066)
Turkey 0.079 0.28 -0.058
(0.029)
Greece 0.041 0.15 -0.049
(0.035)
Italy 0.064 0.23 -0.038
(0.032)




Notes: see table 1
30Table 4
Earnings Regressions for Immigrants and Natives:
Various Immigrantand Comparison Groups
(standard errors in parentheses)
independent variable Base model Immigrants Unskilled Blue collar
(1) since 1977 workers workers
(2) (3) (4)
experience 0.037 0.040 0.023 0.020
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
experience
2/100 -0.061 -0.066 -0.038 -0.035
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
YSM -0.0050 0.0555 0.0013 0.0084
(0.0055) (0.0250) (0.0065) (0.0055)
YSM
2/100 0.0172 -0.3328 -0.0098 -0.0204
(0.0152) (0.1625) (0.0176) (0.00151)
age at immigration 0.0013 0.0054 -0.0028 -0.0012
(0.0014) (0.0041) (0.0014) (0.0012)
5 period dummies yes yes yes yes
4 nation ofbirth dummies yes -- yes yes
cohort dummies 7 1 7 7
R
2 0.356 0.358 0.150 0.135
std. dev. ofindividual effect 0.268 0.287 0.183 0.184
std. dev. ofnoise 0.151 0.152 0.139 0.141
Wald-Test for significance of 0.74 2.53 0040 1.16
YSMand YSM
2 [0.690] [0.279] [0.817] [0.559]
[p-value]
assimilation: -0.021 0.194 0.004 0.037
first 5 years (0.024) (0.086) (0.029) (0.024)
first 10 years -0.033 0.222 -0.004 0.063
(0.041) (0.100) (0.050) \ (0.042)
inital earnings gap -0.215 -0.493 -0.068 -0.120
(0.077) (0.108) (0.062) (0.054)
number ofobservations 13540 10108 4203 7033
1
31Table 5
Earnings Regressions for Immigrants and Natives:
The Role ofEducation
(standard errors in parentheses)
independent means means Base
variable (foreigners) model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
experience 24.8 26.8 0.037 0.036 0.036
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
experience
2/100 -- -- -0.061 - -0.057 -0.057
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
YSM 4.79 17.3 -0.0050 -0.0039 -0.0061
(0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0056)
YSM
2/100 -- -- 0.0172 0.0124 0.0183
(0.0152) (0.0151) (0.0155)
German Schooling 7.50 -- 0.033 0.083 0.083
(0.003) (0.006) (0.006)
German Training 1.49 -- 0.106 0.076 0.077
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
German Schooling 0.36 1.28 -- -0.070 -0.071
*Foreigner (0.007) (0.007)
German Training 0.054 0.20 -- 0.011 0.011
*Foreigner (0.018) (0.qI9)
Foreign schooling 1.69 6.11 0.001 0.000 --
(0.001) (0.001)




independent variable means means
(foreigners)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Schooling Turkey 0.35 4.47 . -- -- -0.004
(0.003)
Schooling 0.37 6.87 -- -- -0.001
Yugoslavia (0.003)
Schooling Greece 0.31 7.41 -- -- 0.003
- (0.003)
Schooling Italy 0.41 6.47 -- -- -0.002
(0.003)
Schooling Spain 0.25 6.38 -- -- 0.005
(0.003)
Training Turkey 0.039 0.50 -- -- 0.005
(0.018)
Training 0.054 1.01 -- -- 0.078
Yugoslavia (0.021)
Training Greece 0.014 0.34 -- -- 0.027
(0.030)
Training Italy 0.029 0.46 -- -- 0.049
(0.023)
Training Spain 0.019 0.49 -- -- 0.025
(0.035)
R
2 0.356 0.379 0.380
Notes: see table 1
Regressors also include a constant, a dummy for foreigners, age atimmigration, 5 period
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